- serious democratic advances are unlikely in the immediate future, no matter how much we and many Cubans would like to believe differently." Castro has not groundlessly concerned himself with what will become of Cuba after his death. The country will feel his grip for a long time to come.
- Between Florida and Venezuela: Cuban immigrants, who live mainly in Florida, could turn out to be a blessing for Cuba, but they could also be a curse
- Conflict between the emigrant Cubans and the new Cuban government, including a significant part of the population still in Cuba, is practically unavoidable.
- It is entirely possible that at least a portion of the Cuban population finds Chavez's inflammatory rhetoric to be more attractive than that of Bush or the Cubans in Florida.
- Cubans were prepared to endure abject poverty under Fidel, who in the eyes of many still retains the aura of a hero, but they will not be so ready to do so for anyone else. The new leaders, whoever they may turn out to be, will need to promise people a better life. Expectations will unavoidably rise, but the possibilities of satisfying them are limited.
- Alongside the competition between Venezuela and America for Cuba is the expectation of a struggle within the Cuban elite
- Partnership with the United States is an insult to the memory of Fidel, and among his current elites are many who who not hesitate to exploit the feelings of their countrymen for the author of the revolution.
- Popular attitudes always lag behind political and economic changes; in Cuba, as for us in Russia, the habitual acceptance of paternalism in politics and economics will only slowly disappear. People adapt with difficulty to the disappearance of their accustomed way of life, even one that is meagre, and to the end of free services.
LA NUEVA CUBA
The Comandante's Legacy
Castro Departs,
but Cuba's Problems Remain
By Maria Lipman *
Editor in Chief of Pro et contra
Kommersant
Russian Daily Online
Infosearch:
José Cadenas
Bureau Chief
USA
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
August 9, 2006
From his hospital bed - or from his deathbed - 80 year-old Fidel Castro addressed his fellow Cubans with a call to continue the revolutionary struggle. In Cuba, many joke about the immortal Castro. Fidel was once offered a Galapagos tortoise, which he refused after discovering that they can live for up to a hundred years. "I don't like pets," he said, "no sooner do you get attached to them, then they go and die on you." But from time to time even Castro talks publicly about the future of Cuba after he is gone: the ideals of the revolution must be preserved, and power will pass to his younger brother Raul.
Leninist Norms
Such behavior sharply divides Castro from the elderly Soviet front men - it is difficult to imagine Brezhnev, Chernenko, or Andropov addressing the nation with decisions of what will come after them. In the USSR, only Lenin left a legacy, and this similarity is hardly coincidental: Castro is the architect of the Cuban revolution, its first and only leader. For Soviet leaders even of Khruschev's time, Castro seemed like a man with a long history. Visiting Cuba in 1960, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan told Khruschev, "I feel as though I am returning to my childhood."
In the beginning of the 1990s, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the cessation of Soviet aid to Cuba hit the country with an economic crisis - store shelves emptied, cars practically disappeared from the streets, and chronic blackouts interrupted power supplies. Castro was subsequently forced into some concessions to private initiative, but he was soon able to pull Cuba mostly back to "Leninist norms." It is in this state of affairs - economic collapse, sharp trade deficit, and social and political stagnation - that Cuba remains today.
Where to Swim?
It is tempting to think that, with the departure of the dictator, the fortunes of the country will fall to Cuban dissidents. However, as William Ratliff, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution and a former specialist in Latin American affairs under Reagan, writes, "serious democratic advances are unlikely in the immediate future, no matter how much we and many Cubans would like to believe differently." Castro has not groundlessly concerned himself with what will become of Cuba after his death. The country will feel his grip for a long time to come.
However, his brother and successor Raul is 75 and, more importantly, he is no Fidel. A regime based on a cult of personality ends with the person at its center. Cubans were prepared to endure abject poverty under Fidel, who in the eyes of many still retains the aura of a hero, but they will not be so ready to do so for anyone else. The new leaders, whoever they may turn out to be, will need to promise people a better life. Expectations will unavoidably rise, but the possibilities of satisfying them are limited.
It seems as though Ratliff is correct. It is unlikely that Cuba will take the path of the Baltic nations or the countries of Central Europe. The Cuban revolution was genuine and specific to Cuba itself, and Cubans will experience no feeling of release from a foreign enemy power, none of what energized the people and stiffened the will to reform in the countries of Central Europe and the Baltics. In addition Cuba, unlike these countries, has "nowhere to return" - democratic institutions will need to be built from scratch, which, as we know from our own experience, can be an impossible task.
William Ratliff has long considered the possibility of Cuba taking China's path. Raul Castro, upon visiting the People's Republic of China, also seemed to enthusiastically embrace China's reforms. Without getting into the complicated cultural and historical differences between the two countries, it is worthwhile to point out that the PRC's leadership has long moved forward on its chosen path without meeting any opposition either from within the country or without. In particular, the Chinese emigrant community has for many years significantly contributed to China's economic success without making any real attempt to influence the politics of the Communist Party.
Between Florida and Venezuela
Cuban immigrants, who live mainly in Florida, could turn out to be a blessing for Cuba, but they could also be a curse. Their capital, professional skills, and business and political ties in the United States are invaluable for Cuba. But this diaspora has already spent decades hating Castro and his regime and dreaming about revenge. For his part, Castro constantly stokes the fires of many Cubans' fears, telling them that those who fled the country dream only about seizing back their homes and factories.
Although some of Florida's Cuban population, especially the younger generation, have taken a slightly softened stance, it is almost impossible to expect that the Cuban diaspora as a whole will have the patience to allow Cuba to build a government on its own, whether according to the Chinese example or to another model. Conflict between the emigrant Cubans and the new Cuban government, including a significant part of the population still in Cuba, is practically unavoidable.
The same problem exists with the American administration. The CIA has struggled for almost half a century to kill or overthrow Fidel. So much money and energy has been wasted that, now that their sworn enemy is nearing his end, can the matter simply be let to run its course? The current U.S. administration, inspired by the idea of disseminating democracy by any means necessary, will hardly be up to the task of showing restraint and subtlety in its dealings with Cuba. Last year the U.S. government designated an official "Cuba transition coordinator," who declared in June in an interview with the New Yorker that the United States will "continue to provide support to a real process of change in Cuba." However, according to the New Yorker, two leading Cuban dissidents called this tactic counterproductive and clumsy.
While Americans dither over their choice of a future partner on the island, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez is building his own relationship with Cuba and is also angling to consolidate his influence after Castro. Chavez is providing Cuba with cheap oil and has shown a serious interest in the exploitation of oil fields that were recently discovered in Cuba's coastal waters. .
It is entirely possible that at least a portion of the Cuban population finds Chavez's inflammatory rhetoric to be more attractive than that of Bush or the Cubans in Florida.
Pragmatists and Dogmatists
Alongside the competition between Venezuela and America for Cuba is the expectation of a struggle within the Cuban elite. Pragmatists, inclined towards effective market reforms, are trying to use the resources offered by America's close proximity and the commitment of the Cuban diaspora. However, American ideological preconceptions of the "right path" are not the only obstacles that will have to be overcome. Partnership with the United States is an insult to the memory of Fidel, and among his current elites are many who who not hesitate to exploit the feelings of their countrymen for the author of the revolution. In recent years, Fidel has actively been naming young people to important political, ideological, and economic posts. Will these new appointees renounce their oath of loyalty to the Comandante, or will they throw themselves into the battle with the "Westerners" in the Cuban elite?
Popular attitudes always lag behind political and economic changes; in Cuba, as for us in Russia, the habitual acceptance of paternalism in politics and economics will only slowly disappear. People adapt with difficulty to the disappearance of their accustomed way of life, even one that is meagre, and to the end of free services. Dismay and disappointment bred nostalgia for the past, as well as enmity for those on whom the evolution of the country depends, thus increasing the chances of those leaders being authoritarian. It is entirely possible that Cuba can expect a succession of leaders of an authoritarian bent. And it will be lucky if the change will happen peacefully.
Maria Lipman, Editor in Chief of Pro et contra
